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Experimental philosophy offers an alternative mode of engagement for public 
philosophy, in which the public can play a participatory role.1 We organized two 
public events on the aesthetics of coffee that explored this alternative mode of 
engagement. The first event focuses on issues surrounding the communication of 
taste.2 The second event focuses on issues concerning ethical influences on taste. 
In this paper, we report back on these two events which explored the 
possibility of doing experimental philosophical aesthetics as public philosophy. We 
set the stage by considering the significance and current state of efforts in public 
philosophy (section 1), and by introducing the emerging sub-discipline of 
experimental philosophical aesthetics (section 2). Then, we discuss the research and 
outreach aspects of the two events on the aesthetics of coffee (section 3 and section 
4). Finally, we conclude by reflecting on the prospects and potential pitfalls of 
experimental philosophy as public philosophy (section 5). 
 
1. Public Philosophy 
 
1.1. Public Philosophy is Valuable 
 
Public philosophy brings the ideas and practices of academic philosophy to a non-
academic audience. Almost all would agree that public philosophy is a good thing: it 
allows academic philosophers to make their knowledge and expertise more than just 
a resource for the privileged few by making it accessible to the many.  
There have been a number of recent calls to rethink philosophers’ attitudes 
towards public engagement. For example, in their essay “The Value of Public 
Philosophy to Philosophers” (2014), Massimo Pigliucci and Leonard Finkelman 
argue that “public philosophy is a valuable, indeed even vitally necessary, 
philosophical activity and should be pursued by professional philosophers for both 
                                                
* An earlier version of this chapter, with photographs by Justin Slee, appeared on the Food&_ website. See 
https://www.foodand.co.uk/articles/experimenting-with-coffee/ . Thanks to Justin, Ross Featherstone of Food&_, 
Dave Olejnik and the Laynes Espresso team, and Colours May Vary for helping us put on the events. We also had 
assistance at the two events from Nicholas Watts and Amanosi Ekenimoh: major props to both of them. Thanks also 
to Counter Culture Coffee for letting use an image of their tasting wheel and to an anonymous reviewer for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. This work was supported by a European Community FP7 Marie Curie International 
Incoming Fellowship, grant PIIF-GA-2012-328977, and by University of Leeds Ignite funding. 
1 Since public philosophy and university teaching both aim to bring the ideas and practices of academic philosophy 
to a wider audience, some of the points we make will unsurprisingly echo Thomas Nadelhoffer and Eddy Nahmias’s 
“Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy as a Valuable Tool for Teaching Philosophy” (2008). 
2 We use the term ‘taste’ in the everyday broad sense which encompasses both what scientists count as taste and as 
flavor. For discussion, see Spence, Auvray, and Smith (2014). 
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practical and theoretical reasons” (87). And although Pigliucci and Finkelman are 
concerned to establish the theoretical value of public philosophy to philosophers, 
they are also centrally concerned with the (alleged) external perception of 
philosophy as useless; this, they argue, can only be changed by philosophers 
engaging in public outreach. 
Similarly, in the blog post “Does Philosophy Matter?” (2015), Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong raises concerns about the extent to which philosophers and 
philosophy are, as he puts it, “out of touch with the rest of society.” Sinnott-
Armstrong concludes by suggesting that: 
 
there must be some way for philosophers to show why and how philosophy is 
important and to do so clearly and concisely enough that non-philosophers can 
come to appreciate the value of philosophy. There also must be some way to write 
philosophy in a lively and engaging fashion, so that the general public will want to 
read it. A few philosophers already do this. Their examples show that others could 
do it, but not enough philosophers follow their models. The profession needs to 
enable and encourage more philosophers to reach beyond the profession. 
 
1.2. Public Philosophy Standardly Operates via a Transmission Model 
 
To some extent the situation does not seem to be so bad with respect to philosophy 
and public engagement. In 1999, the Australian Association of Philosophy instituted 
the AAP Media Prize, designed to honor “the best philosophical piece(s) published 
by a professional philosopher in the popular media in Australasia”, and the 
American Philosophical Association has been running the Public Philosophy Op-Ed 
Contest since 2011. The Stone column at The New York Times has been publishing 
reflections by philosophers and other leading thinkers for a number of years; the 
Philosophy Talk radio show has been running since 2004; and The Philosopher’s 
Zone, broadcasted on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, has run since 2005. 
The Philosophy Bites podcast continues to release short interviews with leading 
philosophers, and Peter Adamson’s history of philosophy podcast “without any 
gaps” is up to its 290th episode.3 Festivals devoted to (or including) philosophy such 
as HowTheLightGetsIn and the recent A Night of Philosophy event in New York City 
have begun to emerge. And the Public Philosophy Journal looks like it is poised to 
make a major contribution by providing an open-access, peer-reviewed online 
journal of public philosophy.4 
As it stands, the vast majority of these valuable public philosophy efforts 
conform to a fairly traditional mode of public engagement. In most of these cases 
public engagement consists primarily in the transmission of some information by 
the philosopher to a largely passive audience. Of course, audience members are 
sometimes able to ask questions or comment on the material presented, but it cannot 
be said that these activities are typically participatory.5 Although philosophers can 
                                                
3 As of December 6, 2017. 
4 See Pigliucci and Finkelman (2014: 90-92) for discussion of different modes of public philosophy. 
5 As a reviewer pointed out, a plausible exception is public philosophy for children. 
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provide a valuable service by engaging in such activities, we believe that this is not 
always the ideal mode in which to teach and learn philosophy.6 Like many others in 
philosophy, we think that “active learning”, which engages learners in their own 
process of learning, is often more pedagogically effective.7 As we shall see below, an 
active approach to public philosophy is possible. 
 
1.3. Public Philosophy Standardly Operates Distinctly from Research 
 
In addition, as it stands, public philosophy is often thought of as something distinct 
from philosophical research; that is, public philosophy is seen as primarily involving 
the dissemination and popularization of research rather than as being part of the 
research process itself.  
Consider the discussion on the blog Daily Nous that ensued after Sinnott-
Armstrong’s blog post (Weinberg 2015). One central theme that emerged in the 
discussion of this issue was a distinction between philosophical research and public 
engagement. “I’ve never seen philosophers criticized for doing public philosophy and 
I’ve never copped any flak for doing it myself. As a few people have already noted it 
doesn’t count as research.” And “I have not heard good public philosophy denigrated, I 
don’t think ever. Maybe it is useful to explicitly add: public philosophy is typically not 
research.” The standard understanding of public philosophy therefore makes it 
periphery to “real philosophical work”. 
We note that this is not always the case in other disciplines. So, for example, 
the Living Laboratories program at the Museum of Science, Boston, brought child 
development researchers to the museum in order to run studies which both 
enhanced public understanding of science and provided the basis for numerous 
peer-reviewed research publications (Biarnes and Kipling 2013). Another example of 
this sort of activity was the research on plating orientation at the ‘Cravings’ 
exhibition held at London’s Science Museum in 2015 (Michel et al 2015).  
In our view, it is no accident that public philosophy standardly operates 
distinctly from research, given that it standardly operates via the transmission 
model. The public lectures, opinion pieces, podcasts, and radio interviews that 
comprise the majority of public philosophy are largely devoted to informing the 
public of relevant philosophical ideas. One-way dissemination makes sense for 
completed research. 
 
1.4. Expanding the Scope of Public Philosophy 
 
Make no mistake, we believe that recent efforts of public philosophy have been 
tremendously valuable for making public concerns relevant to professional 
philosophy, and for making professional philosophy relevant to public concerns. 
                                                
6 Indeed, it is highly questionable whether the transmission model—also known as the banking model—is the best 
way to teach and learn, period (Freire [1968] 2000). 
7 For a discussion of active learning and an overview of some of the research which supports its effectiveness, see 
Prince (2004).  
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Nevertheless, we also believe that the standard modes of operation limit what public 
philosophy could be. 
We believe that the methods of experimental philosophy offer an alternative 
mode of engagement for public philosophy. The public can play an active role by 
experiencing and participating in the philosophical project. Moreover, the public 
events can become part of ongoing research. In this respect, we are agreeing with 
Eric Schwitzgebel (2015) in recognizing the philosophical value of “[e]ngaging with 
the world, trying out one's ideas in action, seeing the reactions of non-academics”. In 
two recent public events involving coffee tasting, we aimed to put these ideas for 
expanding the scope of public philosophy into practice. 
  
2. Experimental Philosophical Aesthetics 
 
The projects we undertook were located in the emerging research field of 
experimental philosophical aesthetics, the sub-branch of experimental philosophy 
that deals with issue of concern to philosophical aestheticians.8 Like many other 
experimental philosophers, we maintain a broad conception of experimental 
philosophy—one that includes a variety of methods from the cognitive and social 
sciences (Rose and Danks 2013). Like many other aestheticians, we maintain a broad 
conception of aesthetics that include questions that overlap with ethics, 
epistemology, and many other philosophical subfields (Walton 2007). The diversity 
of experimental philosophical aesthetics is best illustrated with some of the projects 
that have been undertaken thus far: Meskin et al (2013) on the mere exposure effect 
and bad art; Cova and Pain (2013) on folk aesthetics and aesthetic realism; Liao, 
Strohminger, and Sripada (2014) on the phenomenon of imaginative resistance; and 
Liao, McNally, and Meskin (2016) and Liao and Meskin (2017) on the linguistic 
properties of aesthetic adjectives. 
The studies we discuss below focus on issues relating to gustatory taste. In 
fact, both studies have to do with the taste of coffee. Some aestheticians would be 
hesitant to count issues surrounding gustatory taste as aesthetic (e.g., Scruton 1979). 
This is a mistake. In the first place, the locus classicus for contemporary discussions 
of the aesthetic, Kant’s Critique of Judgment ([1790] 1987), characterizes a wide 
notion of the aesthetic which encompasses judgments of agreeability (including 
tastes “of the tongue, palate and throat”) as well as judgments of beauty. In the 
second place, authors such as Telfer (1996) and Korsmeyer (1999) have presented 
convincing arguments that experiences and judgments of gustatory taste can count 
as aesthetic even if we understand that latter category in the narrow sense in which it 
is often used by contemporary aestheticians. For those who still resist the idea that 
the study of gustatory judgments falls under the heading of aesthetics, we suggest 
that our projects could also be seen as located in the emerging research field of 
philosophy of food (Korsmeyer 1999; Allhoff and Monroe 2007; Kaplan 2012; 
Meskin 2013; Bramble and Fischer 2016). 
                                                
8 See Cova, Garcia, and Liao (2015) for an overview of the research field and Torregrossa (in press) for a defense of 
the research field’s viability.  
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3. The Communication of Taste 
 
3.1. Background 
 
Our first event focused on the challenge of communicating taste judgments. 
Although it has become a commonplace of contemporary philosophy that the word 
of others is central source of knowledge, philosophical aestheticians have often been 
skeptical of our capacity to gain aesthetic knowledge by means of what others tell us 
(Tormey 1973; Whiting 2015).9 The same sort of skepticism is often expressed about 
gustatory judgments. In fact, a number of philosophers have explicitly linked the 
gustatory with the (narrowly) aesthetic in terms of this feature. Kevin Sweeney, for 
example, claims that “gustatory judgement, like critical appreciation, must be based 
on our own sensory experience” (2007: 120).10 If this is right, then the testimony of 
others does not look like it could provide the basis for (warranted) gustatory 
judgment. 
One potential explanation for the failure of aesthetic testimony to transmit 
knowledge is that aesthetic communication is, in some sense, impossible. We are 
skeptical of this view. It would be hard to make sense of the persistence of the 
practices of film, music and restaurant reviews if communication about aesthetic 
matters were impossible. Our alternative hypothesis is that aesthetic communication 
is quite difficult. In ordinary circumstances (that is, with normal non-experts in 
normal conditions), attempting to transmit aesthetic information from one agent to 
another is an activity that is prone to failure. The difficulty of aesthetic 
communication is, we suggest, misdiagnosed by those who are skeptical about the 
transmission of aesthetic knowledge via testimony: they mistakenly treat something 
that is merely difficult as impossible. In this first event we set out to find support for 
this view by exploring how difficult it is to transmit gustatory judgments about 
coffee.  
Our research on the communication of taste judgments about coffee is 
rooted in the work on the language of wine that was begun by Adrienne Lehrer in 
the 1970s (1975; 2009). Lehrer, a linguist, was interested in the nature and function 
of wine talk and designed a number of studies to explore various features of that 
domain of discourse. In some of her earliest work on the topic she conducted 
experiments in which one member of a pair of participants wrote descriptions for 
three wines belonging to the same broad class (e.g., white table wine) which the 
other member of the pair then tried to correctly match. Results showed that 
participants performed no better than chance at matching wines to the correct 
description. As Lehrer put it, “the communication attempt was unsuccessful” (2009: 
110).  In various follow-up studies, Lehrer largely confirmed this main finding—“the 
results showed that one person’s matching of wines with a second person’s 
                                                
9 For a response to this skepticism, see Meskin (2004). For an overview of the literature on aesthetic testimony see 
Robson (2012). 
10 For a similar view, see Korsmeyer (2013: 258-259). For criticism of this sort of view, see Meskin and Robson 
(2015). 
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descriptions was not generally better than chance” (2009: 155) and this was even the 
case with subjects who were scientists at the Department of Viticulture and Enology 
at University of California at Davis.11 Lehrer concluded from this early work that 
much wine talk was phatic; that it is used to create and maintain social bonds rather 
than to communicate taste information. Although this is an interesting hypothesis in 
its own right, we were more interested in Lehrer’s main finding and the methods 
that she used.  
Moreover, there has been a great deal of research following up on, and 
extending, Lehrer’s wine studies. Lawless (1987) recreated Lehrer’s experiment and 
found that expert wine drinkers were significantly better than novices at correctly 
matching flavor descriptions to the correct wine. Hughson and Boakes (2002) found 
that participants were better at correctly matching wines to flavor descriptions when 
given a small list of 14 wine terms rather than a long list of 125 wine terms or no list 
at all. Solomon (1990) tested the ability of experts and novices to correctly match 
flavor description written by other novices and experts. It was only when experts 
matched descriptions written by other experts that they performed better than 
chance. In brief, it appears that research largely supports Lehrer’s claims that 
untrained folk find communication about wine very difficult, but it also suggests that 
experts may be better at such communication than her early results suggested.  
Using a version of Lehrer’s experimental paradigm, would we find that 
ordinary folk could successfully communicate the flavors of coffee? 
 
3.2. Event 
 
In February 2015, we held a public event on the communication of coffee at Colours 
May Vary design and print shop in Leeds, in collaboration with the online food 
journal Food&_ (foodand.co.uk). Twenty-four people paid 5 GBP to participate in 
the event. Our experimental design was based on Lehrer’s earliest wine 
communication experiments described above.  
The participants were split into two groups (each n = 12). The first group 
(“describers”) was sequentially presented with small cups of three distinct coffees. 
Two of the coffees came from the same farm in El Salvador using the same Kenia 
and Bourbon beans but processed differently (either washed or natural) to give 
related but distinct flavors. The third coffee came from Rwanda using heirloom and 
Bourbon beans. Coffees were batch brewed by Laynes Espresso, a well-regarded 
Leeds coffee shop, and kept at the same temperature to ensure taste consistency. 
 
                                                
11 It is, however, the case that those subjects did do significantly better than chance in a matching experiment run 
later by one of those UC-Davis subjects. 
 7 
 
Figure 1. Counter Culture Coffee’s flavor wheel. Courtesy Counter Culture Coffee. 
 
Figure 2. Material for participants at the communication of taste event.  
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Describers were also given Counter Culture Coffee’s flavor wheel (Figure 1) 
and a form with spaces to describe each coffee (Figure 2). We recommended to the 
describers that they use the more basic descriptors in the center of the wheel (such as 
‘floral’, ‘earthy’, ‘nut’ or ‘spice’) rather than the more specific descriptors on the 
outside (such as ‘burnt sugar’ or ‘dried fig’) but they were told that they were free to 
describe the coffees as they saw fit.12 Describers were given five minutes to taste and 
describe each coffee. 
The second group (“identifiers”) were also presented with the three coffees 
(served sequentially) and the flavor wheel. In addition, each identifier received a 
completed form from one randomly-assigned describer. Identifiers were then asked 
to correctly match the descriptions with the coffees. Identifiers were also given five 
minutes to taste and identify each coffee. 
The results surprised us. Not only did participants do no better than chance 
at matching coffee to descriptions, they actually did worse than chance. Out of 
twelve participant pairs, none correctly identified all coffee tasted, four correctly 
identified one coffee tasted, and the remaining eight correctly identified none of the 
coffee tasted. (For comparison, if participants simply guessed at random, we would 
have expected that out of twelve participant pairs, two would correctly identify all 
coffee tasted, six would correctly identify one, and four would correctly identify 
none.) The difference between the actual response we found and chance is 
statistically significant, X2(2) = 6.667, p = 0.036. This result suggests that it is very 
difficult for people to communicate about coffee tastes. Of broader significance, this 
result suggests that aesthetic communication could indeed be quite difficult. 
 
3.3. Public Philosophy 
 
In addition, this event also demonstrated that experimental philosophical aesthetics 
is an effective mode of public philosophy. Not only were the people at this event 
participants of an experimental study, they were also participants in a public 
philosophy dialogue. After the result was revealed, they were given the opportunity 
to interpret the result and discuss its philosophical significance. 
Dave Olejnik, head barista of Laynes Espresso, thought that he could have 
chosen the coffees so that everyone identified all three perfectly. This led to a 
discussion of whether this result really provides any reason to think that 
communication about coffee is difficult or, instead, that our results were just an 
artifact of the particular set of coffees used. In addition, although we had 
recommended to the participants that they use the more basic descriptors in the 
center of the flavor wheel rather than the more specific descriptors on the outside, 
many admitted to not following our advice. The crowd then engaged in interesting 
discussion about why they might not have followed our advice and how that could 
have influenced the result.13 A number of participants suggests various subjectivist or 
                                                
12 The main flavour wheel has 20 distinct flavor categories in the center (some of which contain more than one 
descriptor) and 120 on the outside. There are additional descriptors for body, faults, and ‘adjectives & intensifiers’. 
13 Some studies suggest that people are better at communicating about the taste of wine when they are presented with 
a short list of wine terms rather than a long list (Hughson and Boakes, 2002). 
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relativist interpretations of the result, and this led to another interesting discussion 
about what the point of giving tasting notes might be, if communication about coffee 
tastes was really so difficult. In short, the people who attended the event were not 
just passive recipients of philosophy, but participants in philosophizing. 
 
4. Ethical Influence on Taste 
 
4.1. Background 
 
Philosophers have long debated the connection between the moral value and the 
aesthetic value, primarily focusing on artworks.14 How do ethical aspects of an 
artwork influence aesthetic judgments? With some nuances, the debate on the 
interaction between morality and aesthetics in art can be extended to apply to food.15 
For our purpose here, we will focus on two views. Food moralism says that a food’s 
moral value is directly connected to its aesthetic value. Food autonomism says that a 
food’s moral value is unconnected to its aesthetic value. If people were food 
moralists, then we would expect that learning morally positive information about the 
coffee would make it taste better to them. Conversely, if people were food 
autonomists, then we would expect that learning morally positive information about 
the coffee would make no difference to how it tastes to them. 
There is very limited empirical research on ethical influences on people’s 
taste perception. And only two articles specifically address this influence with coffee. 
De Pelsmacker, Driesen, and Rayp (2005) found that consumers are willing to pay 
more for fair trade coffee, but at a premium below the typical markup. However, 
they do not directly address perception and experience of tasting coffee. Sörqvist et 
al (2013) presented participants with two cups of coffee, one of which is unlabeled 
and the other is labeled as eco-friendly, even though they were in fact qualitatively 
identical. Across three studies, they found that found that participants who have 
sustainability-congruent attitudes rate “eco-friendly” coffee as tastier. They thus 
conclude that “Eco labels not only promote a willingness to pay more for the product 
but also lead to a more favorable perceptual experience of it” (Sörqvist et al 2013: 1). 
 
4.2. Event 
 
In March 2015, we held another public event—this time, on the ethical influence on 
taste—again at Colours May Vary and in collaboration with Food&_ and Laynes 
Espresso.  Twenty people paid 5 GBP to participate in the event. Our experimental 
design was inspired by Sörqvist et al (2013), but with two important modifications.  
First, instead of a within-subject design, we employed a between-subject 
design. So, we divided up participants into two groups, one in the morally neutral 
condition (n = 11) and the other in the morally positive condition (n = 9). The coffee 
was batch brewed and kept at a constant temperature. Participants in the morally 
                                                
14 See Eaton (2016), Giovanelli (2007), and McGregor (2014) for recent overviews of the debate. 
15 See Liao and Meskin (in press) on the interaction between morality and aesthetics in food. See Korsmeyer (2012) 
for arguments for food moralism and against food autonomism. 
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neutral condition did the tasting first, while the other participants engaged in an 
unrelated activity. 
Second, instead of an eco-labeling manipulation, we manipulated 
participants’ moral attitudes toward the coffee producers’ work conditions. So, 
participants in the morally positive condition received the following text prior to 
their coffee tasting (the bolded parts are the additions to the information given to 
participants in the morally neutral condition): 
 
Square Mile in London roasted the coffee beans used. The beans are a mix of 
Bourbon and Kenia varieties. They were produced in El Salvador and wet processed. 
The farm owner is very welfare conscientious: she pays the workers 50% above 
minimum wage and provides social services, such as medical care, for their 
families. 
 
They then answered the question “What do you think of the taste of the coffee?” on a 
7-point unnumbered scale from “among the worst I’ve tasted” on the left to “among 
the best I’ve tasted” on the right (figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Material for participants at the ethical influence on taste event. 
 
While the responses were being collected and analyzed by our research 
assistants, participants were given a brief primer on the philosophical debate on the 
interaction between morality and aesthetics, especially with respect to food. And 
then the results were revealed to everyone at the same time. 
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Figure 4a and 4b. Taste ratings at the ethical influence on taste event. 
 
Contrary to our expectations, we did not find an ethical influence on 
people’s taste of coffee. In fact, the morally neutral condition group (M = 5.23; SD = 
0.343; figure 4a) thought the coffee tasted better than the morally positive condition 
group (M = 4.89; SD = 1.294; figure 4b) did, but the difference is not statistically 
significant, t(8) = 0.763, p = 0.467.16 However, given that the study only has relatively 
few participants, we hesitate to say anything definitive on the basis of this 
nonsignificant result.  
 
4.3. Public Philosophy 
 
Still, the result was good for generating discussion. The participants were briefly told 
about potential explanations due to experimental artifacts, such as the relatively low 
number of participants and the difference in study design, and then asked to think 
about why we found this result. Some participants made interesting empirical 
conjectures. For example, one thought many participants already have positive 
associations with the coffee provider, which could lead them to assume positive 
moral standing of the coffee served. And, as such, even in the morally neutral 
condition the assumed positive moral standing remained on participants’ minds 
during tasting. Other participants drew on their own experiences to theorize about 
the results. For example, one made the fine distinction between how something 
tastes and the experience of tasting something, and conjectured that although 
positive moral information can raise the experience of tasting something (e.g. make 
you want to go to a shop again), it cannot change how something tastes. The 
experimental results, and participation in this exercise, thus gave participants an 
opportunity to draw on seemingly mundane experiences (like drinking coffee!) to 
philosophize about the complicated relationship between ethics and taste.  
 
  
                                                
16 Participants’ responses to the question of how much they’d pay for the cup of the coffee showed the same pattern. 
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5. Prospects and Potential Pitfalls 
 
As we highlighted at the start, nearly everyone agrees that public philosophy is 
valuable. But standard approaches, which operate via the transmission model and 
present already completed philosophical research, have drawbacks. We hope that, by 
sharing our experiences in organizing these two public events on the aesthetics of 
coffee, we have shown that experimental philosophy—perhaps especially 
experimental philosophical aesthetics—can be a way to expanding the scope of 
public philosophy. Specifically, we think the methods of experimental philosophy 
can be incorporated into public philosophy to encourage more two-way interactions 
between the academic philosopher and the public, and to integrate the aims of 
outreach and research. 
Still, we would be remiss to not mention some trade-offs and limitations. An 
advantage of the transmission model is that it allows philosophical ideas to reach 
many people with a single effort. In contrast, our public events were necessarily 
limited to relatively few participants in order to preserve interactivity. Moreover, the 
transmission model is applicable to a wider range of audiences. In contrast, given 
that experiments were central to our public events, ethical considerations make them 
unsuitable for people in vulnerable circumstances, such as prisoners and children. 
We must keep these potential pitfalls in mind in conducting experimental 
philosophy as public philosophy. 
The recognition of the prospects and the potential pitfalls of experimental 
philosophy as public philosophy underscores the necessity of methodological 
pluralism in public philosophy. Different audiences, considerations and contexts call 
for different models. 
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